Mercer Law Review
Volume 59
Number 1 Annual Survey of Georgia Law

Article 5

12-2007

Construction Law
Dana R. Grantham
David L. Hobson
David J. Mura Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr
Part of the Construction Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Grantham, Dana R.; Hobson, David L.; and Mura, David J. Jr. (2007) "Construction Law," Mercer Law
Review: Vol. 59 : No. 1 , Article 5.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol59/iss1/5

This Survey Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

Construction Law

by Dana R. Grantham*
David L. Hobson"
and David J. Mura, Jr.***
This Article surveys construction law decisions handed down by
Georgia courts and construction-related legislation enacted by the
Georgia General Assembly between June 1, 2006 and May 31, 2007. The
cases this year are divided into four general categories: (1) contracts, (2)
torts, (3) liens and bonds, and (4) arbitration. Recent legislation is
summarized in Section V of this Article.
I.
A.

CONTRACTS

Contractual Obligation to Maintain Liability Insurance

Depending on the ultimate resolution of Vakilzadeh Enterprises v.
Housing Authority,' termination for cause on a construction project may
become more difficult if the nondefaulting party fails to act immediately
In addition, notwithstanding the
upon the other party's breach.
standard construction contract provision that requires thirty days prior
written notice of cancellation or nonrenewal of the contractor's or

* Senior associate in the firm of Smith, Gambrell & Russell, LLP (Construction Law
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University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 2001). Executive Editor, Georgia
Law Review (1999-2001). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
** Associate in the firm of Epstein, Becker & Green, P.C. (Commercial Litigation
Section), Atlanta, Georgia. Mississippi State University (B.A., cum laude); Indiana
University (M.A., Economics); Emory University School of Law (J.D., with honors, 2004).
Member, Emory Law National Moot Court Team (2003-2004). Member, State Bar of
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*** Associate in the firm of Smith, Gambrell & Russell, LLP (Construction Law and
Litigation Section), Atlanta, Georgia. Georgia Institute of Technology (B.C.E., 1994);
University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., with honors, 2002). Member, State Bar of
Georgia.
1. 281 Ga. App. 203, 635 S.E.2d 825 (2006).
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subcontractor's liability insurance, the following case underscores the
importance of calendaring the date when the required liability insurance
coverage will expire so that notice of breach, if applicable, may be timely
given.'
In Vakilzadeh Affordable Housing Development Corporation of DeKalb
("Affordable") hired Vakilzadeh Enterprises, Inc., doing business as
Allstates Construction Co. ("Allstates"), as its general contractor on a
subdivision construction project and entered into a written construction
agreement with Allstates.
After Allstates allegedly breached its
contract, the Housing Authority of DeKalb County ("Housing Authority"),
as Affordable's assignee, terminated the agreement. Allstates subsequently sued the Housing Authority for wrongful termination. The trial
court granted the Housing Authority's motion for summary judgment on
the ground that the Housing Authority was authorized under the
contract to terminate the agreement with Allstates because Allstates had
failed to comply with a standard contract provision which required it to
maintain liability insurance without interruption until the completion
of the project.3 Allstates appealed, and the court of appeals reversed,
determining that there were material issues of fact (a jury question)
about whether Allstates' noncompliance with the liability insurance
provision entitled Affordable to terminate the parties' contract.4
In the underlying case, Affordable and Allstates entered into a
construction agreement that required Allstates to provide all labor,
materials, equipment, and services required to complete a residential
subdivision for an adjustable contract price of approximately $1.9
million. The subdivision was to be built in three phases. The parties
agreed that before Affordable would authorize Allstates to proceed with
the second two phases, Allstates had to satisfactorily complete construction of the first phase of the subdivision ("Phase One").5
The parties' construction agreement authorized Affordable to
terminate Allstates if it refused to supply enough workers or materials,
failed to pay its subcontractors for work performed, persistently
disregarded any applicable laws, or substantially breached the contract.
The agreement also required Allstates to (1) maintain liability insurance
covering itself and its subcontractors without interruption from the time
work commenced until completion of the project and (2) provide
certificates of insurance prior to commencing work showing that
coverage would not be cancelled or nonrenewed without thirty days prior

2.
3.
4.
5.

See generally id.
Id. at 203-04, 635 S.E.2d at 825-26.
Id. at 204, 635 S.E.2d at 826.
Id.
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written notice to Affordable. Allstates provided a certificate of general
liability insurance for the period of November 15, 2001 through
November 15, 2002 before beginning Phase One, which was completed
in April 2003, about four months after the certificate expired.6
Allstates was then asked to start the second phase of the project
("Phase Two"), even though the previous certificate of insurance had
expired; unlike before, the owner did not request Allstates to provide a
current certificate of insurance.
In September 2003, during the
construction of Phase Two, a subdivision water line was broken, and the
Housing Authority notified Allstates that it was going to hold Allstates,
as general contractor, responsible for the damages. The Housing
Authority also informed Allstates that it understood Allstates may have
allowed its liability insurance to lapse and instructed Allstates to
provide a certificate of current liability coverage immediately. The
contractor produced a certificate of insurance for the period of December
1, 2003 through December 1, 2004 but did not provide the Housing
Authority with any evidence showing that it had maintained insurance
between November 15, 2002 and December 1, 2003. In January 2004
the Housing Authority terminated Allstates, citing several reasons,
including Allstates' failure to maintain continuous liability insurance
coverage.7
Allstates then sued the Housing Authority, which then moved for
summary judgment, contending that as a matter of law, good cause to
terminate existed because Allstates had failed to maintain liability
insurance during the entire contract period. Allstates argued that the
parties had mutually departed from the requirement that it maintain
insurance coverage and that the Housing Authority therefore waived the
insurance requirement as a ground for termination.8
The court of appeals reversed the trial court's grant of summary
judgment to the Housing Authority on the basis that a genuine issue of
material fact existed about whether the Housing Authority, knowing
that the original certificate of insurance expired in November 2002,
waived the general contractor's obligation to maintain uninterrupted
liability insurance by allowing Allstates to proceed with Phase Two of
the project without ever receiving a current certificate of insurance. 9
The court concluded that another question for the jury was whether
Allstates' alleged breach of the contract provision which required it to
maintain uninterrupted liability insurance coverage until completion of

6.
7.
8.
9.

Id. at 204-05, 635 S.E.2d at 826.
Id. at 205, 635 S.E.2d at 826-27.
Id., 635 S.E.2d at 827.
Id. at 206, 635 S.E.2d at 827.
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the project constituted a "'substantial breach of contract"' that authorized termination of the agreement.1"
B.

Verifying ContractingAuthority on Public Works Projects

In Griffin Bros. v. Town of Alto," the town of Alto (the "Town")
decided to install a water pipeline and contacted Griffin Bros., Inc.
("Griffin"), a contractor, to provide a rough estimate of the cost. A few
months later, Griffin was asked by a Town council member to provide a
more detailed estimate in writing, which Griffin put together and
supplied. Trying to avoid rising material costs, the Town mayor then
telephoned Griffin and asked it to go ahead and order the pipe. After
the materials were ordered, the mayor telephoned Griffin again and
notified it that the Town intended to advertise the project for bid and
that Griffin needed to submit a formal bid as part of that process. 2
Only one company besides Griffin, Higgins Construction Co.,
("Higgins"), submitted a formal bid. Griffin was the low bidder, but
Higgins's higher bid price included a longer run of pipe that was more
consistent with the Town's needs and bid solicitation. After the Town
awarded the project to Higgins, Griffin filed a complaint against the
mayor, the Town council members, and the Town, and it sought damages
and injunctive relief. 3
The defendants moved for summary judgment on the bases that the
Town was not legally obligated to accept the lowest bid, and the mayor
lacked authority to unilaterally bind the Town to a contract with Griffin.
The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment,
and Griffin appealed, contending that (1) the Town was obligated by
statute to accept the lowest bid, (2) the Town was estopped from denying
it had a contract with Griffin, and (3) the Town's prior course of
conduct-having Griffin perform work based on informal instructions-justified Griffin's reliance on the mayor's request to purchase pipe
for the Town's new pipeline. 4
The court of appeals disagreed, determining that each of Griffin's
contentions was without merit. 5 First, Georgia's statutory requirement
that public works construction contracts be awarded to the lowest
responsible and responsive bidder through a competitive bid process does

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id. at 207, 635 S.E.2d at 828.
280 Ga. App. 176, 633 S.E.2d 589 (2006).
Id. at 177, 633 S.E.2d at 590.
Id.
Id. at 177-78, 633 S.E.2d at 590-91.
Id.
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not apply to projects that can be performed for less than $100,000.16
The highest bid for the pipeline project, $89,989, was well under
$100,000, so the Town was not required by statute to accept Griffin's
lower bid.' 7 In addition, the court reasoned that consistent with the
Town's invitation to bid, the winning bid included more linear feet of
pipe and better met the Town's needs.' 8 Therefore, the court concluded
that the Town acted properly and within the scope of its discretionary
authority when it awarded the contract to the higher bidder, Higgins. 19
Griffin next contended that the Town was estopped from denying that
a contract existed between the Town and Griffin because Griffin had
justifiably relied on the mayor's request to order pipe as an indication
that it had been awarded the construction contract to perform the
work.2" Again, the court disagreed.21 The cost of the pipe materials
ordered at the mayor's request was $15,729, but by resolution of the
Town council, the mayor's unilateral authority to obligate the Town was
limited to $2,000.22

The court explained that section 45-6-5 of the

Official Code of Georgia Annotated23 ("O.C.G.A.") provides that "'[a]ll
persons dealing with a public officer"' have a duty to "'ascertain the
extent of"' the officer's conferred authority.24 As the court noted, those

who fail to ascertain the extent of an officer's authority do so at their
own peril.25 If Griffin had endeavored to ascertain the extent of the
mayor's authority before ordering the pipe, Griffin would have been able
to determine that the mayor lacked authority to bind the Town to a
contract with Griffin for expanding its water infrastructure. 26 Therefore, the court held that Griffin's purported contract with the Town was
unauthorized and unenforceable, and the limitation established by the
Town council on the mayor's unilateral authority to bind the Town to a
contract was unaffected by any purported prior course of conduct on the
part of the
Town or Griffin's alleged detrimental reliance on the mayor's
27
request.

16. Id. at 177, 633 S.E.2d at 590 (citing O.C.G.A. §§ 36-91-21 to -22 (2006)).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 177-78, 633 S.E.2d at 590.
19. Id. at 178, 633 S.E.2d at 590.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. O.C.G.A. § 45-6-5 (2002).
24. Griffin Bros., 280 Ga. App. at 178, 633 S.E.2d at 590-91 (quoting City of Atlanta
v. Black, 265 Ga. 425, 426, 457 S.E.2d 551, 552 (1995)).
25. Id., 633 S.E.2d at 590.
26. Id., 633 S.E.2d at 591.
27. Id. at 178-79, 633 S.E.2d at 591.
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Quantum Meruit and Official Immunity

Authorization to commence construction work on a public works
project was also an issue in Brown v. Penland Construction Co.2" In
the underlying case, Penland Construction Co. ("PCC") constructed an
indoor baseball hitting facility for a high school on land owned by the
Walker County Board of Education (the "Board"). No written construction agreement was ever executed even though the facility was approved
by the Board and built at the request of the former varsity baseball
coach, Michael Brown. When the Board refused to pay, PCC sued
Brown, the Board, the school district, and the school's athletic booster
club. The trial court denied the defendants' motions for directed verdict,
and a jury eventually awarded $150,000 to PCC against Brown, the
Board, and the school district, jointly and severally, under the theory of
quantum meruit.29 The court of appeals affirmed.3 ° The Georgia
Supreme Court then granted certiorari to determine whether the trial
court erred in denying Brown's motion for directed verdict, in which
Brown argued he was not liable to PCC in quantum meruit.3 1 The
supreme court reversed in favor of Brown.32
As a threshold matter, the supreme court noted:
[Any suit against a public official in his or her individual capacity is
barred by official immunity where the public official has engaged in
discretionary acts that are within the scope of his or her authority, and
the official has not acted in a wilful or wanton manner[,] with actual
malice[,] or with the actual intent to cause injury.3
Here, the record contained no allegations that Brown acted in a willful,
malicious, or wanton manner, or with any intent to cause injury, or that
he had acted beyond the scope of his discretionary authority.34

28. 281 Ga. 625, 641 S.E.2d 522 (2007).
29. Id. at 625, 641 S.E.2d at 523. Quantum meruit, meaning "'as much as he has deserved,"' is an equitable doctrine that permits a contractor to recover compensation for the
reasonable value of its services under an implied contract. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1276
(8th ed. 2004).
30. Brown, 281 Ga. at 625, 641 S.E.2d at 523 (citing Brown v. Penland Constr. Co., 276
Ga. App. 522, 623 S.E.2d 717 (2005)).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 625-26, 641 S.E.2d at 523 (citing Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 452
S.E.2d 476 (1994); GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 9(d)).
34. Id. at 626, 641 S.E.2d at 523.
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Therefore, the court held that a 3quantum meruit claim against Brown
was barred by official immunity.
In addition, the court concluded that even if Brown had acted beyond
the scope of his authority, a quantum meruit action against him still
could not prevail because the construction services provided by PCC
were valuable to the Board, not Brown, and it was the Board, not Brown,
who accepted the services.3 6 Because Brown did not individually accept
the services, he did not implicitly agree to pay for them.3" Further, the
court reasoned, Brown was not unjustly enriched because there was no
evidence that he personally obtained any benefit from PCC's construction
of the facility.38 Because all of the benefits of PCC's services were
conferred on the Board or the school, not Brown, the court ruled that
there was no valid claim against Brown for quantum meruit or unjust
enrichment.3 9

D. Allocation of Risk in Contracts for Construction
In Holder Construction Group, LLC v. Georgia Tech Facilities,Inc.,4
Holder Construction Group ("Holder") and Georgia Tech Facilities
("GTF") entered into a guaranteed maximum price contract ("GMP") to
construct a fast-track apartment project for Georgia Tech. As the
construction manager at risk, Holder agreed to hold the trade contracts
and to assume the risks attendant to large GMP construction projects,
including cost overruns, construction deficiencies, and delays. After
construction began, Holder encountered difficulties due to a dramatic
increase in steel prices and late delivery of steel materials. Holder
requested, but was denied, a time extension from GTF. Holder then
filed a declaratory judgment action, contending it was due additional
compensation under the contract, as well as a time extension. Holder
later amended the complaint, seeking more than $3 million under breach
of contract, quantum meruit, and unjust enrichment theories. GTF filed
a motion for summary judgment in response to Holder's claims. The
trial court granted GTF's motion in part and denied it in part, and
Holder appealed.41
On appeal, Holder asserted that both its time extension and acceleration cost claims resulted from delays caused by the industry-wide steel

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 627, 641 S.E.2d at 524.
Id.
282 Ga. App. 796, 640 S.E.2d 296 (2006).
Id. at 796-97, 640 S.E.2d at 297.
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crisis and that it was entitled to $3.1 million in acceleration costs due to
GTF's refusal to grant a time extension."
However, as the court of
appeals pointed out, under Holder's construction contract's force majeure
clause, late delivery of steel was not listed as a cause that entitled
Holder to a time extension.4" In fact, the contract expressly specified
that late deliveries of materials, for reasons other than those set forth
in the force majeure clause, did not justify a time extension."
Holder argued, nonetheless, that there were other delays, apart from
the steel crisis, that were caused by the owner and for which Holder
should have been granted a time extension.4 5 The court of appeals
determined, however, that there was no evidence in the record that
Holder had requested a time extension for any purported owner-caused
delay prior to the steel crisis delay.4 6 Further, the court of appeals
noted that there was no evidence in the record that but for the other
owner-caused delays, the price of steel would have remained stable and
the steel would have been timely delivered.47 The court noted an
affidavit from Holder's operations manager stating that but for the
owner-caused delays, Holder might have been able to procure adequate
amounts of steel for the project before the price of steel changed so
dramatically.4" However, the court dismissed the affidavit as mere
speculation that was insufficient to create a genuine issue of material
fact.49 The court of appeals also determined that there was no basis in
the construction contract to award damages from the project owner to
Holder due to the rise in steel prices because the contract contained no
price escalation clause, and there was evidence Holder had already been
paid for that claim from a construction contingency fund. °
Holder also claimed damages for allowances and $1.7 million in
allegedly unpaid change order requests. The trial court granted GTF
summary judgment on these claims, finding that Holder was contractually obligated to follow the change order procedure as set out in its
agreement but failed to do so for fifty-four out of sixty-seven change
order requests.5 ' On appeal, the court of appeals agreed that Holder
had not met its burden to show by the record that it was entitled to

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 798, 640 S.E.2d at 297.
Id., 640 S.E.2d at 298.
Id.

Id.
Id. at 799, 640 S.E.2d at 298.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 800, 640 S.E.2d at 299.
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recover on those claims." The court of appeals determined, however,
that the trial court's order on those claims was internally inconsistent
with respect to several change order requests.5 3 The court accordingly
identified this inconsistency as an issue that would need to be addressed
before trial on Holder's remaining claims.54
Finally, Holder asserted that the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment to GTF on Holder's quantum meruit claim. Holder
argued that because the final scope of work was never added to the
contract in accordance with a particular provision, there was no express
contract governing the completion of the project.5" The court of appeals
disagreed, noting that Holder contemplated performing all of the work
necessary to complete the project from the time of its bid, and thus the
contract, not quantum meruit, governed the rights and responsibilities
of the parties.56
II.

TORTS

A. Effect of Continuous Employment on Workers' Compensation
DamagesArising out of an Automobile Accident
Construction companies that temporarily house employees near
geographically distant construction projects, rather than open a local
office, should take note of the recent Georgia Supreme Court decision in
Ray Bell Construction Co. v. King. 7 In the broadest application to
date of Georgia's doctrine of continuous employment, the court held a
contractor liable for workers' compensation dependency benefits after one
of its relocated supervisors, who was on sick leave at the time, died as
a result of injuries sustained in a Sunday afternoon traffic accident
while returning from a purely personal mission.58
In 2006 the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the award of dependency benefits to the minor child of a deceased construction superintendent,
Howard King ("King" or "decedent"), determining that at the time of his
death, King was in the continuous employment of his employer, Ray Bell
Construction Co. ("Ray Bell").59 The Georgia Supreme Court granted
Ray Bell's writ of certiorari to determine whether the court of appeals

52.

Id.

53. Id.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 801, 640 S.E.2d at 300.
Id.
Id. at 802, 640 S.E.2d at 300.
281 Ga. 853, 642 S.E.2d 841 (2007).
Id. at 857, 642 S.E.2d at 845.
Ray Bell Constr. Co. v. King, 277 Ga. App. 144, 144-45, 625 S.E.2d 541, 542 (2006).
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applied the proper two-prong test for a compensable injury, which the
supreme court reiterated in a previous case: "[Tihe injury by accident
must arise in the course of employment and out of the course of
employment, 'two independent and distinct criteria .... 60Unless an
accidental injury satisfies both prongs, it is not compensable.6 1
The facts of Ray Bell Construction were that King, a Florida resident,
lived in a company-provided apartment in Fayetteville, Georgia, and
worked as a superintendent on a project site in Jackson, Georgia."
King's employer, Ray Bell, also provided King with a company truck "as
a term and condition of his employment."63 One Sunday, King was
returning in the company truck from a personal mission delivering
family furniture to a storage shed in Alamo, Georgia, when he was
injured in a traffic accident. He died from his injuries the next day. An
administrative law judge awarded dependency benefits to the decedent's
child, a decision later affirmed by the State Board of Workers' Compensation ("State Board"), the Superior Court of Monroe County, and the
Georgia Court of Appeals. The appellate division of the State Board held
that King suffered a compensable injury because at the time of the
accident, King, a continuous employment employee driving an employerprovided vehicle, had concluded his personal mission and was returning
either to the project site or to his employer-provided housing.64 The
Georgia Supreme Court limited its review to the question of whether the
decedent was covered by the doctrine of continuous employment if he
was returning to the general vicinity of the job site, the employerprovided housing, or both.65
Under Georgia's continuous employment or "traveling employee"
doctrine, broad workers' compensation coverage is afforded to an
employee who must lodge near his or her employer's job site and be
available for work.66 For purposes of the Workers' Compensation
Act,67 such an employee is, "'in effect, in continuous employment, day
and night,' . . . and activities performed . . . for the health and comfort
of the employee, including recreational activities, arise out of and are in

60. Ray Bell Constr., 281 Ga. at 853-54, 642 S.E.2d at 843 (alteration in original)
(quoting Mayor of Savannah v. Stevens, 278 Ga. 166, 166, 598 S.E.2d 456, 457 (2004)).
61. See id.
62. Id. at 853, 642 S.E.2d at 843.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 853-54, 642 S.E.2d at 843.
65. Id. at 854, 642 S.E.2d at 843.
66. Id. at 855, 642 S.E.2d at 844.
67. O.C.G.A. §§ 34-9-1 to -421 (2004 & Supp. 2007).
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the course of the employment.""8 "Workers' compensation coverage is
not afforded a traveling employee in continuous employment when the
employee is engaged in a personal mission not related to the health and
comfort of the employee."69 However, the continuous employment
resumes when the employee turns back from his personal mission by
returning to "'the general proximity"' of the place of employment "'at a
time he was employed to be in that general proximity."'7 °
Construing the evidence most favorably to King, the supreme court
concluded that because King sustained his injuries in the FayettevilleJackson area, that meant that he had returned from his trip to the
general proximity of the project site.71 Therefore, his continuous
employment coverage as a traveling employee had resumed whether he
was returning to the employer's job site or to his employer-provided
lodging.72
In a spirited dissent, three justices asserted that the majority's
reliance on the "turning back" doctrine was misplaced because the
doctrine was intended to apply only in those cases when an employee
starts a business mission, deviates from the mission, and then returns
to the mission.7" According to the dissent, the doctrine has no application when the decedent's mission (for example, moving family furniture
to a storage shed in Alamo, Georgia) was "wholly personal from its
inception."7 4 The dissent opined, "On a given mission, one cannot go
back into or resume something one has never started."75 Of particular
significance to the dissent was the fact that at the time of King's
accident, King was on sick leave from his employment.76 Because King
was neither on Ray Bell business at the time of the accident nor in the
process of returning to the scope of his employer's business, the
undisputed facts, according to the dissent, demanded a determination

68. Ray Bell Constr., 281 Ga. at 855, 642 S.E.2d at 844 (quoting Wilson v. Ga. Power
Co., 128 Ga. App. 352, 354, 196 S.E.2d 693, 694 (1973)).
69. Id. at 856, 642 S.E.2d at 844 (citing Thornton v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co.,
198 Ga. 786, 790, 32 S.E.2d 816, 819 (1945)).
70. Id. (quoting London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Herndon, 81 Ga. App. 178, 181,
58 S.E.2d 510, 512 (1950)).
71. Id., 642 S.E.2d at 845.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 859-60, 642 S.E.2d at 847 (Melton, J., dissenting) (citing Lavine v. Am. Ins.
Co., 179 Ga. App. 898, 899-900, 348 S.E.2d 114, 116 (1986)).
74. Id. at 860, 642 S.E.2d at 847 (emphasis added).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 861, 642 S.E.2d at 848.
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that King's injuries did not arise out of or in the course of King's
employment.77
B.

The "Borrowed Servant"Doctrine

In Southway Industrial Services, Inc. v. Boyd,7" the Georgia Court of
Appeals held that the borrowed servant doctrine entitled Southway
Industrial Services, Inc. ("Southway") to summary judgment. 79 A
general contractor, Entech Corporation ("Entech"), leased from Southway
a crane, along with a crane operator, to move large steel plates for a
construction project.8 0 The lease agreement provided that the crane
operator would remain "'under [Entech's] exclusive jurisdiction,
supervision and control,"' that Entech "'has the right to exercise
complete direction and control over the Operator, that [Southway] will
exercise no control over the Operator,"' and that Entech "'has the
exclusive right to discharge the Operator."''
One morning when the crane operator was moving the large steel
plates into position, a strong gust of wind caused some of the steel plates
to hit and injure Gary Boyd, a laborer. Boyd brought suit against
Southway, claiming that Southway was responsible for the crane
operator's alleged negligence under the theory of respondeat superior.8 2
Southway moved for summary judgment on the basis that under Georgia
law, the crane operator was a borrowed servant, and therefore,
Southway could not be held vicariously liable for the operator's
negligence. The trial court denied Southway's motion 8 but
issued a
3
certificate for immediate appellate review of the decision.
As set forth in the recent case Tim's Crane & Rigging, Inc. v.
Gibson," the borrowed servant rule is a widely recognized exception to
the doctrine of respondeat superior."8 Under the borrowed servant rule
generally, "'If a master lends his servants to another[,] then the master
is not responsible for any negligence of the servant committed within the

77. Id.
78. 283 Ga. App. 850, 642 S.E.2d 889 (2007).
79. Id. at 851, 642 S.E.2d at 890.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 851-52, 642 S.E.2d at 890.
82. Id. at 852, 642 S.E.2d at 891. Respondeat superior is a doctrine under which an
employer is liable for injury to a person or property of another proximately resulting from
acts of the employee done within the scope of his or her employment in the employer's
service. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1338 (8th ed. 2004).
83. Southway, 283 Ga. App. at 851, 642 S.E.2d at 890.
84. 278 Ga. 796, 604 S.E.2d 763 (2004).
85. Id. at 797, 604 S.E.2d at 765.
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scope of his employment by the other."' 86 Under Georgia law, an
employee is considered a borrowed servant if (1) the borrowing entity
exercises complete control and direction over the employee for the
occasion, (2) the lending entity has no such control, and (3) the
borrowing entity has the exclusive right to discharge the employee.8 7
Here, all three elements were satisfied. First, the lease agreement
between Entech and Southway expressly gave Entech the "'right to
exercise complete direction and control over the [crane] Operator.' 8 8
Second, the lease agreement explicitly provided that "'[Southway] will
exercise no control over the Operator."'8 9 In fact, as the court pointed
out, there were no Southway employees at the project site supervising
the work of the crane operator at the time of the accident.9" Finally,
the lease agreement stated that Entech "'has the exclusive right to
discharge the Operator,"' thereby establishing the third element of the
borrowed servant analysis. 91 The third element was further supported
by the testimony of Entech's construction foreman who stated in his
deposition that he believed he had the authority to discharge the crane
operator if he felt the operator was not performing satisfactorily.9 2 As
a result, the court held that the crane operator was a borrowed servant,
and Entech, rather than Southway, was liable for any alleged negligence
on the part of the crane operator.93
C.

Negligent Design and Limitation of Damages by Contract

In Lanier at McEver L.P v. Planners & Engineers Collaborative,
Inc.,94 the owner and developer of an apartment complex sued a
professional engineering firm for negligent design after noticing
pavement settling and cracking, erosion, and subsidence in a stormwater
drainage system designed by the engineering firm. In a motion for

86. Southway, 283 Ga. App. at 852, 642 S.E.2d at 891 (quoting Staffing Res., Inc. v.
Nash, 218 Ga. App. 525, 525, 462 S.E.2d 401, 403 (1995)).
87. Henry L. Balkcom IV, Dana R. Grantham & Devin H. Gordon, Construction Law,
57 MERCER L. REV. 79, 91 (2005) (citing Tim's Crane, 278 Ga. at 797, 604 S.E.2d at 765).
88. Southway, 283 Ga. App. at 853, 642 S.E.2d at 891; see also Tim's Crane, 278 Ga.
at 797, 604 S.E.2d at 765. In Tim's Crane, the court stated that where the contract
between two employers explicitly sets forth each element of the borrowed servant rule,
"'the contract between the parties is controlling as to their responsibilities thereunder.'"
278 Ga. at 798, 604 S.E.2d at 765 (quoting Montgomery Trucking Co. v. Black, 231 Ga.
211, 213, 200 S.E.2d 882, 884 (1973)).
89. Southway, 283 Ga. App. at 853, 642 S.E.2d at 891.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. 285 Ga. App. 411, 646 S.E.2d 505 (2007).
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partial summary judgment, the engineering firm, Planners & Engineers
Collaborative, Inc. ("PEC"), argued that according to the terms of the
parties' agreement, any damages determined to be owed by PEC should
be limited to the amount of fees paid to PEC by the developer, Lanier at
McEver, L.P. ("Lanier"). 95 The parties' agreement contained a limitation on damages clause, which provided that "'the total aggregate
liability of PEC and its subconsultants to all those named shall not
exceed PEC's total fee for services rendered on this project.""'9 Finding
this provision to be enforceable, the trial court granted PEC's motion.97
On appeal, Lanier argued that the damages limitation clause should
be invalidated for a number of reasons. First, relying on the decision in
98
Emory University v. Porubiansky,
Lanier argued that the clause was
unenforceable and void as against public policy.9 In Porubiansky an
exculpatory clause in a contract for dental services was deemed to be
void as against public policy because it essentially relieved the dentist
of his duty to exercise reasonable care in contravention of a statute
requiring dentists to exercise reasonable care and skill.'00 Unlike the
clause at issue in Porubianksy,however, the court of appeals determined
that the damages limitation clause at issue in this case did not release
the engineer from liability but simply capped damages at the amount of
fees paid under the contract.101
Lanier next argued that the clause violated O.C.G.A. section 13-82(b),'1 2 Georgia's nonproportional fault, anti-indemnity provision,
which, at the time of the appeal, provided:
"[an] .. .agreement relative to the construction, alteration, repair, or
maintenance of a building structure ...purporting to indemnify or
hold harmless the promisee against liability for damages arising out of
bodily injury to persons or damage to property caused by or resulting
from the sole negligence of the promisee, his agents or employees, or
indemnitee is against public policy and is void and unenforceable.""'

95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 412, 646 S.E.2d at 507.
Id., 646 S.E.2d at 506.
Id. at 412-13, 646 S.E.2d at 507.
248 Ga. 391, 282 S.E.2d 903 (1981).

99. Lanierat McEver, 285 Ga. App. at 413, 646 S.E.2d at 507 (citing O.C.G.A. § 13-82(a) (1981 & Supp. 2007)). According to O.C.G.A. section 13-8-2(a), "A contract which is
against the [public] policy of the law cannot be enforced." O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(a).
100. Lanier at McEver, 285 Ga. App. at 413, 646 S.E.2d at 507; see also O.C.G.A. § 511-27 (2000).
101. Lanier at McEver, 285 Ga. App. at 414, 646 S.E.2d at 507-08.
102. O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(b) (1982 & Supp. 2007).
103. Lanierat McEver, 285 Ga. App. at 414, 646 S.E.2d at 508 (alterations in original)
(brackets in original) (quoting O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(b) (Supp. 2005)). Subsequently, O.C.G.A.

2007]

CONSTRUCTION LAW

69

Lanier's argument was rejected based on the fact that the damages
limitation clause did not exculpate PEC from any wrongful conduct but
"merely limit[ed] the amount of damages Lanier [could] recover from
PE. ,, 104
The court was also unpersuaded by Lanier's final argument that the
limitation of liability clause constituted an unenforceable liquidated
damages penalty under Georgia law. 05 The court noted that although
the parties agreed to a limit on the amount of damages recoverable from
PEC, they did not agree to a fixed measure of damages.0 6 The
amount of damages would still have to be determined by the trier of
fact.0 7 The court of appeals therefore affirmed the judgment of the
trial court."0 '
D.

Duty To Warn

The Georgia Court of Appeals clarified the duty to warn in the case of
McKinney v. Regents of the University System of Georgia."9 David
McKinney, an employee of LF Pipeline who was hired to install the gas
line at a construction project at Georgia State University, was severely
burned when the jackhammer he was using struck an electrical line."0
He subsequently filed suit against the Regents of the University System
of Georgia, the Turner Mitchell Joint Venture, and the electrical
subcontractor, Mark Henderson, Inc. ("Henderson"), alleging they had
"negligently failed to mark the location of the underground power lines,
to notify him of the existence of the lines, and to keep the worksite
safe.""'
Although there was conflicting evidence regarding whether LF
Pipeline had received notice of the buried electrical line, the supervisor
for LF Pipeline testified at his deposition that a superintendent of either
the water company or the plumbing contractor had notified him that
power cables encased in concrete were installed between the transformer

section 13-8-2(b) was amended in the 2007 Session of the Georgia General Assembly by
House of Representatives Bill 136, which became effective July 1, 2007. Ga. H.R. Bill 136,
§ 1 (2007); see also infra Part V.
104. Lanier at McEver, 285 Ga. App. at 414, 646 S.E.2d at 508.
105. Id. at 414-15, 646 S.E.2d at 508.
106. Id. at 415, 646 S.E.2d at 508.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. 284 Ga. App. 250, 643 S.E.2d 736 (2007).
110. Id. at 250, 643 S.E.2d at 737.
111. Id. at 252, 643 S.E.2d at 738.
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According to the supervisor, McKinney was
and the building.'12
present at this meeting but apparently "'[was not] listening.' ')i 3 At
his deposition, McKinney testified that no one told him there were power4
lines encased in concrete between the transformer and the building."
Based on the supervisor's testimony, the court of appeals affirmed the
trial court's decision to grant the defendants' motion for summary
judgment." 5 Without deciding whether the defendants owed a duty to
McKinney, the court held that any such duty was discharged by the fact
that the supervisor had actual knowledge of the location of the electrical
lines.1 6 The discrepancy regarding "[tihe source of the warning [was]
immaterial, as the sole issue [was] whether LF Pipeline had knowledge
of the electrical lines."" 7 Moreover, the court held that whether
McKinney himself had notice of the electrical lines was irrelevant
because the supervisor's knowledge of the hazard was sufficient to
discharge any duty owed directly to McKinney.18
According to the court, the fact that a superintendent on the project
had answered "'okay"' when McKinney informed him that he had
planned to use a jackhammer did not render summary judgment
improper.119 "Having informed LF Pipeline of the existence of the
electrical lines, the superintendent was not required to further instruct
how to120do the job or of the risks inherent in the use of its equipment.
The court of appeals also rejected McKinney's argument that the cases
relied upon by the trial court in reaching its decision12 applied only
to open and obvious dangers rather than hidden dangers such as the one
at issue in this case. 22 The court disagreed that the holdings in the

112. Id. at 251, 643 S.E.2d at 737.
113. Id. (brackets in original).
114. Id., 643 S.E.2d at 738.
115. Id. at 252, 643 S.E.2d at 738.
116. Id. at 252-53, 643 S.E.2d at 738-39 (citing Douberly v. Okefenokee Rural Elec.
Membership Corp., 146 Ga. App. 568, 569-70, 246 S.E.2d 708, 709 (1978)).
117. Id. at 253, 643 S.E.2d at 739 (citingDouberly, 146 Ga. App. 568, 246 S.E.2d 708).
118. Id. at 252-53,643 S.E.2d at 738 (citing Long Leaf Indus. v. Mitchell, 252 Ga. App.
343, 344, 556 S.E.2d 242, 244 (2001) (holding that an owner can satisfy its duty to warn
of a hazard by notifying the employer of someone working on its premises)).
119. Id. at 253, 643 S.E.2d at 739.
120. Id.
121. The trial court relied upon Douberly v. Okefenokee Rural Electric Membership
Corp., 146 Ga. App. 568, 246 S.E.2d 708 (1978), and Brown v. American Cyanamid &
Chemical Corp., 372 F. Supp. 311 (S.D. Ga. 1973).
122. McKinney, 284 Ga. App. at 253, 643 S.E.2d at 739.
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cited cases were restricted to open and obvious
dangers only and refused
123
to impose any such limitation upon them.
Finally, McKinney unsuccessfully argued that the defendants had a
separate duty to install red magnetic warning tape above the electrical
lines. 124
Although McKinney contended that industry standards
require the installation of warning tape in a situation such as this, he
offered no support for that proposition. 12' He also failed to prove that
a requirement to install warning tape was contained in the project
specifications. 126 According to the court, even if such a showing had
been made, summary judgment would nevertheless have been proper
because
the supervisor had actual knowledge of the location of the power
127
lines.
G.

DiscretionaryActs of Public Officers and Qualified Immunity

The court of appeals addressed the distinction between ministerial and
discretionary acts of public officers and employees in Golden v.
Vickery. 121
Several days prior to installing siding on a building,
Southern Heritage Construction ("Southern") notified the electric
department of the City of Calhoun that the work was to occur near the
city's high-voltage lines and requested that the lines be de-energized.
Because the lines carried power to a number of electricity users, the
superintendent of the electric department, Larry Vickery, chose to install
protective covering on the lines rather than de-energize them. The
protective covering failed, and Charles Golden, an employee with
Southern, suffered severe burns when the metal bucket lift he was using
came into contact with the lines. 29
Golden and his wife brought suit against Vickery and several other
employees of the electric department to recover for personal injuries and
loss of consortium. The trial court granted Vickery's motion for
summary judgment, finding his decision to use protective30 covering was
a discretionary act entitling him to qualified immunity.
"Qualified immunity protects individual public agents from personal
liability for discretionaryactions taken within the scope of their official

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id.
Id. at 253-54, 643 S.E.2d at 739-40.
Id. at 254, 643 S.E.2d at 739.
Id. at 253-54, 643 S.E.2d at 739.
Id. at 254, 643 S.E.2d at 740.
285 Ga. App. 216, 645 S.E.2d 695 (2007).
Id. at 217, 645 S.E.2d at 696.
Id. at 216-17, 645 S.E.2d at 696.
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authority .... ,131 However, public agents "may be personally liable
... for ministerial acts negligently performed or acts performed with
malice or an intent to injure. 132 The court of appeals described the
distinction between ministerial and discretionary acts as follows:
A ministerial act is commonly one that is simple, absolute, and
definite, arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist, and
requiring merely the execution of a specific duty. A discretionary act
calls for the exercise of personal deliberation and judgment, which in
turn entails examining the facts, reaching reasoned
conclusions, and
133
acting on them in a way not specifically directed.
Although the court surveyed a number of cases in which the distinction between ministerial and discretionary acts was explored, its decision
ultimately hinged on its interpretation of the High-Voltage Safety Act
("HVSA").13 4 The HVSA provides that, in the event the operator of a
high-voltage line is given notice of work occurring within ten feet of the
line, it may choose to de-energize the line or install protective covering,
"'whichever safeguard is deemed by the owner or operator to be feasible
under the circumstances.' 1 3
This statute clearly gave Vickery the
discretion to decide what protective measure to take.3 6 The discretionary nature of Vickery's decision was further supported by the fact
that the Calhoun Electric Department had no policy or procedure for its
37
employees to follow in deciding what protective measure to take.
Because Vickery exercised a discretionary function within the scope of
his official authority, he was entitled to qualified immunity, and the trial
court's grant of summary judgment to Vickery was affirmed.13

131. Id. at 217, 645 S.E.2d at 696 (emphasis added).
132. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Middlebrooks v. Bibb County, 261 Ga. App. 382, 385,
582 S.E.2d 539, 543 (2003)).
133. Id. at 217-18, 645 S.E.2d at 696.
134. Id. at 220-21, 645 S.E.2d at 698; O.C.G.A. § 46-3-33 (2004).
135. Golden, 285 Ga. App. at 221, 645 S.E.2d at 698 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 46-3-33).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 220-21, 645 S.E.2d at 698-99 (citing Stone v. Taylor, 233 Ga. App. 886, 506
S.E.2d 161 (1998) (holding that a county commissioner's decision not to level the shoulder
of a resurfaced road was a protected discretionary act because the county had no policy or
procedure regarding leveling, and the decision necessarily involved the official's judgment
and deliberations)).
138. Id. at 221, 645 S.E.2d at 699.
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III.
A.

73

LIENS AND BONDS

Payment Bond Not Substitute Collateral

In Sierra Craft, Inc. v. TD. Farrell Construction,139 T.D. Farrell
Construction ("Farrell") was hired as the general contractor on a
construction project for Wal-Mart.
Farrell subcontracted the fire
sprinkler work to the VP Group ("VP"), which in turn purchased various
materials for its work from Sierra Craft, Inc., doing business as Pacific
Fire Protection ("Sierra"). Pursuant to its contract with Wal-Mart,
Farrell obtained a payment bond in the full amount of its contract price
from its surety, Travelers Casualty and Surety Company of America
("Travelers"). Sierra sent Farrell a notice to the contractor, which stated
that it was providing materials to VP for a contract price of $20,000 on
the project. VP, however, subsequently failed to complete the sprinkler
system or to pay Sierra in full for the materials it purchased. Sierra
demanded payment from Farrell and Travelers in the amount of
$79,692.10 and filed a claim of lien against the project property for the
same amount. Farrell then filed an action for a declaratory judgment
that any claim or lien by Sierra was limited to $20,000, the amount
specified in its notice to contractor, and that the payment bond should
serve as substitute collateral and discharge Sierra's lien. After a
hearing, the trial court denied Sierra's motions to dismiss the defendants' declaratory judgment actions, ruling that Sierra's bond claim was
limited to $20,000 and that the bond discharged Sierra's materialmen's
lien. Sierra appealed. 4 °
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling that Farrell's
declaratory judgment action was properly before the court, but disagreed
that Sierra's claim was limited to the dollar amount estimated in its
notice to contractor.' 4 ' When they were filed, both Farrell's notice of
commencement and Sierra's notice to contractor incorrectly stated that
they were provided pursuant to the Georgia mechanic's and materialmen's lien statute, O.C.G.A. sections 44-14-361 and 44-14-361.5.62
Both the trial court and the court of appeals concluded that the
respective notices, though mislabeled, adequately complied with the
notice requirements as contemplated by Georgia's payment bond statute,

139.
140.
141.
142.

282 Ga. App. 377, 638 S.E.2d 815 (2006).
Id. at 377-79, 638 S.E.2d at 817-18.
Id. at 377, 638 S.E.2d at 817.
Id. at 380, 638 S.E.2d at 819; O.C.G.A. §§ 44-14-361, -361.5 (2002 & Supp. 2007).
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O.C.G.A. section 10-7-31.143 , A notice to contractor must include,
among other things, "'the contract price or anticipated value of the labor,
material, machinery, or equipment to be provided.' ' 144
The court
construed the statute and determined, however, that the payment bond
statute does not limit future claims of a notifying supplier, such as
Sierra, for three reasons: (1) the statute does not expressly limit bond
claims to the amount stated in the notice to contractor as the contract
price; (2) the intent of the statute is to provide notice to a contractor
soon after work begins, not to provide the contractor with an exact value
of the material or services to be provided; and (3) the statute does not
contemplate any additional notice in the likely event that the contract
14 5
price or value changes.
Farrell asserted that it was also entitled to rely on the amount stated
in Sierra's notice as a fixed contract price under the principles of
promissory or equitable estoppel. 146 The court was not persuaded,
however, because Sierra's notice made no actual promise to Farrell, only
a representation of fact, and Farrell did not change its position in
reliance thereon. 147 Moreover, the court remarked that Sierra's notice
did not ultimately cause VP's alleged failure to perform or pay Sierra for
48
materials. 1
Next, Sierra contended that Farrell's payment bond was not substitute
collateral for the owner's property and therefore did not effectively
discharge Sierra's lien. 49 The court of appeals agreed, holding that
the lien was not discharged because Farrell's payment bond did not fully
satisfy the statutory requirements for a lien release bond set forth in
O.C.G.A. section 44-14-364.'15 According to the court, the lien release
statute contemplates that a lien release bond will be filed in connection
with a pre-existing lien claim and be "specifically tailored to apply to
that claim."'' Here, Farrell's payment bond was obtained prior to
Sierra filing its lien claim; therefore, it was not specifically tailored or
designed to compensate Sierra for monies it was allegedly due." 2 In

143. Sierra Craft, 282 Ga. App. at 381, 638 S.E.2d at 819; O.C.G.A. § 10-7-31 (2000 &
Supp. 2007).
144. Sierra Craft, 282 Ga. App. at 381, 638 S.E.2d at 819 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 10-731(a)(4)).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 382, 638 S.E.2d at 819-20.
147. Id., 638 S.E.2d at 820.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 384, 638 S.E.2d at 821; O.C.G.A. § 44-14-364 (2002 & Supp. 2007).
151. Sierra Craft, 282 Ga. App. at 383, 638 S.E.2d at 821.
152. Id. at 383-84, 638 S.E.2d at 821.
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addition, the lien release bond statute requires that the bond be twice
the amount of the particular lien claim."' 3 Although Farrell's payment
bond amount far exceeded twice the amount of Sierra's claim, the bond
did not satisfy other substantive requirements of a lien release bond
under O.C.G.A. section 44-14-364.15 Thus, the bond did not discharge
the real estate from Sierra's lien. 5'
Finally, Sierra claimed that the trial court erred in denying its motion
for summary judgment on its payment bond claim, but the court of
appeals disagreed.'
Based on the affidavits and invoices provided,
it appeared that VP may have removed some materials from the project
that had previously been delivered and that VP's total contribution to
the project might have been less than the amount claimed by Sierra.'5 7
As a result, the court concluded that a genuine issue of material fact
existed about whether Sierra supplied the full $79,692.10 worth of
materials as claimed, and summary judgment was properly denied by
the trial court. 58
B.

Payment Bond v.Equitable Lien

In McArthur Electric, Inc. v. Cobb County School District,' 9 a
general contractor, Manhattan Construction Co. ("Manhattan"), hired
McArthur Electric, Inc. ("McArthur") to perform the electrical work on
a Cobb County high school construction project. Manhattan provided a
payment bond but subsequently declared McArthur to be in default and
terminated its subcontract. In response, McArthur filed a federal
lawsuit against Manhattan and its sureties under the payment bond.
In addition, McArthur filed a complaint in Cobb County Superior Court,
seeking an equitable lien on unpaid funds allegedly due from the school
district to Manhattan. After the parties filed motions for summary
judgment, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the
school district, concluding that McArthur
was not entitled to an
6 °
equitable lien, and McArthur appealed.
In Georgia, payment bonds are required for all construction contracts
on public works construction projects when the estimated contract

153. Id.
154. Id. at 384, 638 S.E.2d at 821.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 385, 638 S.E.2d at 821-22.
158. Id.
159. 281 Ga. 773, 642 S.E.2d 830 (2007).
160. Id. at 773, 642 S.E.2d at 831.
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amount for work to be performed is greater than $100,000.161 Even
though subcontractors and materialmen on public projects have no viable
lien claim as an alternative remedy to recovering unpaid amounts from
general contractors, the Georgia Supreme Court noted that a comparable
statutory remedy is available "in the form of an action on the general
contractor's payment bond."' 62 In the event the requisite payment
bond is not available, Georgia law permits an unpaid subcontractor or
1 3
materialman to proceed directly against the owner. 1
The court determined that with regard to this public works project,
Manhattan had provided a proper payment bond that was available to
McArthur, and it held that McArthur had an adequate remedy at
law.'
Therefore, McArthur was not entitled to bring a direct cause
of action against the school district or to assert an equitable lien against
165
funds held for payments otherwise due to the general contractor.
Significantly, nothing was presented to the court to suggest that
McArthur's legal remedy against the sureties on the payment bond was
inadequate.'6 6 Finally, the court reasoned that permitting an equitable lien in addition to the legal remedy of an action on the payment bond
would contravene Georgia's pre-judgment garnishment statute, O.C.G.A.
section 18-4-40,167 as well as undermine the ability of public owners to
avoid becoming entangled in pay disputes between the general contractor
68
and its subcontractors.

E. Municipalities'Obligation to Require Bonds
In Jacks v.City of Atlanta,169 the court of appeals reversed the trial
court's decision regarding the City of Atlanta's (the "City") obligation to
require its contractors to obtain a bond on a project allegedly necessitated by an emergency. 7 ° Following an explosion of decomposing methane gas at an Atlanta city park, the City hired R&D Testing and
Drilling ("R&D") as its general contractor on the remediation project
without requiring that R&D obtain a payment and performance bond.
R&D then subcontracted with C&S Environmental Services ("C&S"),

161. Id. at 774, 642 S.E.2d at 831 (citing O.C.G.A. § 36-91-90 (2006 & Supp. 2007)).
162. Id. at 773-74, 642 S.E.2d at 831.
163. Id. at 774, 642 S.E.2d at 831 (citing O.C.G.A. § 36-91-91 (2006 & Supp. 2007)).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 775, 642 S.E.2d at 832.
167. O.C.G.A. § 18-4-40 (2004).
168. McArthur Electric, 281 Ga. at 775, 642 S.E.2d at 832.
169. 284 Ga. App. 200, 644 S.E.2d 150 (2007).
170. Id. at 200, 644 S.E.2d at 151.
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which in turn hired Lindsey Jacks. Although the project began in July
2001, it was halted two months later due to a lack of funds.1 71
Approximately a year and a half later, an auditor for the City
discovered that R&D had been overpaid approximately one million
dollars and that C&S had never been paid in full. In June 2003 the City
agreed to pay $373,529 to C&S in exchange for a release of claims, which
provided that C&S would guarantee that each and every supplier,
subcontractor, and subconsultant to C&S would be paid in full. One
month later, Jacks notified the City that it was still owed $183,587. The
City did not respond, and Jacks filed suit against the City and others on
August 28, 2003. Jacks later moved for partial summary judgment
against the City, asserting that the City violated the Georgia Local
Government Public Works Construction Law'72 by failing to require
R&D to obtain a bond for the project and that, consequently, the City
was liable to Jacks directly. In response, the City argued that in
emergency situations such as this one, contractors were not required to
provide bonds, and in any event, the City was not liable because Jacks
had not complied with the statutory requirement to give ante litem
notice within six months after his work was completed.' 73
The court noted that O.C.G.A. section 36-91-22(e) 174 creates an
exception to a municipality's obligation to require bonds on public
projects.' 7 5 The statute provides in part: "'The requirements of this
chapter shall not apply to public works construction projects necessitated
by an emergency; provided, however, that the nature of the emergency
shall be described in the minutes of the governing authority.' ' 176 The
trial court found that a question of fact existed regarding the project's
status as an emergency and denied Jacks's motion for summary
judgment on the issue of whether77the City was obligated to require R&D
to obtain a bond for the project.
On appeal, the court of appeals concluded that the City failed to meet
the requirements of O.C.G.A. section 36-91-22(e) and reversed the trial
17
court's denial of Jacks's summary judgment motion on this issue. 1
Under the statute, the City was required to describe the nature of the
emergency "'in the minutes of the governing authority.'"1 79 Here, the

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id. at 201, 644 S.E.2d at 151.
O.C.G.A. §§ 36-91-1 to -95 (2006 & Supp. 2007).
Jacks, 284 Ga. App. at 201, 644 S.E.2d at 151-52.
O.C.G.A. § 36-91-22(e) (2006).
Jacks, 284 Ga. App. at 202-03, 644 S.E.2d at 152.
Id. at 203, 644 S.E.2d at 152 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 36-91- 2 2 (e)).
Id. at 201, 644 S.E.2d at 152.
Id. at 203, 644 S.E.2d at 152-53.
Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 36-91-22(e)).
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original city ordinance authorizing the project made no mention of an
emergency, and even though a later ordinance passed more than four
years after the methane explosion referred to the initial authorization
as "'emergency authorization for the clean-up,'" the City failed to
produce any meeting minutes contemporaneous with the project's
inception that described the project as an emergency.8 0 The court
required strict compliance with the meeting minutes requirement in the
statute, explaining that its purpose is to protect subcontractors and
material suppliers from loss by requiring the governing authority to
prove that it "treated the situation as an emergency at the time it
occurred."'8'
The court of appeals also reversed the trial court's decision that
Jacks's claim was untimely under the applicable ante litem statute,
noting that "'[tlhe time within which the notice must be given in order
to comply with the statute begins to run on the day the breach of the
city's duty occurred."" 2 Here, the court concluded that the date of the
breach was June 3, 2003, when both the City and C&S refused to pay
Jacks pursuant to their settlement and release of claims.8 3 Because
Jacks presented written notice to the City shortly thereafter, the court
held that the claim was timely brought. 184
IV.

ARBITRATION

During the survey period, Georgia courts (1) expanded the role of trial
courts in determining whether res judicata is an arbitrable issue under
agreements to arbitrate, (2) broadened the application of res judicata to
prior arbitration awards, and (3) restated the rule on what constitutes
manifest disregard of the law under Georgia's arbitration code.
A.

Arbitrabilityof the Res Judicata Effect of PriorArbitration

In Fall 2006 the long-running saga of Bryan County v. Yates Paving
& Grading Co. ("Yates IT')"s5 finally ended with the Georgia Supreme
Court's determination that despite the existence of an otherwise valid
arbitration agreement, when parties do not expressly reserve the issue

180. Id., 644 S.E.2d at 152.
181. Id., 644 S.E.2d at 153 (emphasis added).
182. Id. at 202, 644 S.E.2d at 152 (quoting Schaefer v. Mayor of Athens, 120 Ga. App.
301, 302, 170 S.E.2d 339, 341 (1969)).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. 281 Ga. 361, 638 S.E.2d 302 (2006).
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for arbitration, the procedural question of whether a claim is barred
by
186
res judicata is for the trial court, not the arbitrator, to decide.
The underlying dispute arose out of a public works contract between
Bryan County (the "County" or "owner") and Yates Paving & Grading
Co., Inc. ('Yates" or "contractor") to construct and improve public roads
in a local subdivision." 7 The contract included a broad arbitration
clause which provided that "'[aIll claims, disputes and other matters in
question between [the parties] arising out of, or relating to the Contract
Documents .. .will be decided by arbitration."'"" 8 Prior to completion
of the project, the owner ordered Yates to cease construction and hired
a third party to complete the project. Yates filed a demand for
arbitration and eventually obtained an award of money damages that
was later confirmed by the trial court and affirmed on appeal.
Thereafter, Yates filed a motion seeking a second arbitration relating to
the issue of appellate attorney fees and costs that it incurred defending
the original arbitration award. Three years later, the contractor filed a
third demand for arbitration, asserting that the County's wrongful
conduct effectively rendered the contractor unable to bid on other
governmental contracts requiring bonds.' 89
In its defense to the third demand for arbitration, the County asserted
that the new claims were barred by res judicata because they could have
been raised in the first arbitration. The trial court agreed and entered
an injunction precluding arbitration.1 9 ° Yates appealed, taking the
position that under the terms of its contract with the County, the issue
of res judicata was an issue for the arbitrators, not the trial court.' 9'
In a case of first impression, the court of appeals agreed that the res
judicata effect of the final award issued in the first arbitration should be
decided by the
arbitrators, not the trial court, "because it arises out of
' 92
the contract.'
The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed,
concluding that the language of the parties' arbitration agreement did
not indicate that the parties had expressly intended for only an

186. Id. at 361, 638 S.E.2d at 302; see also Yates Paving & Grading Co. v. Bryan
County (Yates 1), 275 Ga. App. 347, 620 S.E.2d 606 (2005); Henry L. Balkcom IV, Dana R.
Grantham & Devin H. Gordon, ConstructionLaw, 58 MERCER L. REV. 55, 69 (2006); Dennis
J. Webb, Jr., Henry L. Balkcom IV & Dana R. Grantham, Construction Law, 56 MERCER
L. REV. 109, 140-41 (2004).
187. Yates 11, 281 Ga. at 362, 638 S.E.2d at 303.
188. Id. at 363, 638 S.E.2d at 304 (alteration in original) (brackets in original).
189. Id. at 362, 638 S.E.2d at 303.
190. Id.
191. Yates I, 275 Ga. App. at 348, 620 S.E.2d at 608.
192. Id. at 350, 620 S.E.2d at 609.
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arbitrator to resolve the issue of res judicata, "which is a principle of law
that does not arise out of the contract documents."' 93 The court noted
that despite the existence of an otherwise valid arbitration agreement,
there was no contractual or other legal basis for making res judicata an
arbitrable issue."9' Because arbitration had already taken place on the
issues previously raised, the court concluded there was "nothing left for
an arbitrator to resolve relating to those same issues"-or in other
words, no arbitrable claims remained that could be submitted to an
arbitrator. 9 ' Moreover, the court reasoned that "forcing trial courts
to submit procedurally barred matters to arbitration" undermined,
196
rather than enhanced, the policy of the Georgia Arbitration Code.
In a spirited dissent, three justices sided with the judgment of the
court of appeals that "issues of procedural arbitrability are presumptively for the arbitrator," not the trial court, to decide. 197 The dissent
concluded that the majority's holding ignored not only "the arbitration
scheme established by the [Georgia General Assembly]," but also "the
of disputes, and the language of the parties'
policy favoring arbitration
198
arbitration agreement."

B.

Finality of Claims Decided in PriorArbitration
In Dalton Paving& Construction,Inc. v. South Green Construction of

Georgia, Inc. ," the court of appeals, citing the rule enunciated above
in Yates H, concluded that res judicata barred a subcontractor's claims
against a project's owner, developer, and others despite the fact that
none of the defendants other than the general contractor were parties to
the prior arbitration proceeding between the general contractor and the
subcontractor or signatories to the arbitration agreement. °°
A contractor, South Green Construction of Georgia, Inc. ("South
Green"), hired a subcontractor, Dalton Paving & Construction, Inc.
("Dalton Paving"), to perform grading, curb, and gutter work on an
apartment construction project. After a dispute arose, the parties
submitted their claims to arbitration in accordance with the arbitration
clause in their contract.20 ' Following a hearing, the arbitrator award-

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Yates II, 281 Ga. at 363, 638 S.E.2d at 304.
Id. at 364 n.3, 638 S.E.2d at 305 n.3.
Id. at 363, 638 S.E.2d at 304.
Id. at 364 n.3, 638 S.E.2d at 305 n.3; O.C.G.A. §§ 9-9-1 to -84 (2007).
Id. at 366, 638 S.E.2d at 306 (Hunstein, J., dissenting).
Id. at 364, 638 S.E.2d at 305.
284 Ga. App. 506, 643 S.E.2d 754 (2007).
Id. at 510, 643 S.E.2d at 757.
Id. at 506, 643 S.E.2d at 755.
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ed the subcontractor its contract balance, interest, and attorney fees, but
denied its remaining claims, including its request that the arbitrator
"pierce South Green's corporate veil and 'find that South Green and the
'2 2
Owner acted as a joint venture. ' 1
After the arbitration was completed, the subcontractor sued the
general contractor, owner, developer, and others in a five-count
complaint and also requested that the court confirm the arbitrator's
award. The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary
judgment on Dalton Paving's claims regarding piercing the corporate veil
and acting as a joint venture but denied the motion for summary
judgment on Dalton Paving's remaining conversion and conspiracy
claims. All parties appealed." 3
Under Georgia law, a judgment in a prior case or arbitration "'shall
be conclusive between the same parties and their privies."'2 4 Privies
include "'all persons who are represented by the parties ... [and] all
who are in privity with the parties; the term privity denoting mutual or
successive relationship to the same rights of property."'2 " Here, the
court determined that even though South Green was technically the only
defendant who was a party in the prior arbitration, for res judicata
purposes, the remaining defendants were in privity with South Green as
holders of an ownership interest in the apartment complex and third
party beneficiaries of the subcontract.20 6
Under Georgia law, claim preclusion doctrines apply equally to
arbitration and court proceedings, even if the subsequent cause of action
includes additional relief or a new defendant is added.2 7 Here, the
subcontract required the parties to arbitrate "'[a]ny claim arising out of
or related to this Subcontract. '' 20 8 Accordingly, the court of appeals
determined that Dalton Paving was precluded by res judicata from
raising in a separate court action any and all claims that it raised or
could have raised during its prior arbitration. 20 9 Because Dalton
Paving had raised the pierce the corporate veil and joint venture claims
in its post-hearing brief in the prior arbitration, res judicata barred
those claims as well as its new claims for conversion and conspiracy that

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 506-07, 643 S.E.2d at 755.
at 507, 643 S.E.2d at 755-56.
at 508, 643 S.E.2d at 756 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 9-12-40 (2006 & Supp. 2007)).
(quoting Bennett v. Cotton, 244 Ga. App. 784, 785, 536 S.E.2d 802, 804 (2000)).
(citing Bennett, 244 Ga. App. at 785, 536 S.E.2d at 804).
at 509 n.2, 643 S.E.2d at 757 n.2.
at 509, 643 S.E.2d at 757.
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it was aware of but failed to assert in the prior arbitration proceed21
ings. 0
C.

Manifest Disregardof the Law

In Dan J. Sheehan Co. v. McCrory Construction Co.,211 the Georgia
Court of Appeals addressed the recurring questions of who is a
prevailing party and what constitutes manifest disregard of the law
212
under Georgia's arbitration statute, O.C.G.A. section 9-9-13(b)(5).
In Sheehan McCrory Construction Co., ("McCrory" or "contractor")
entered into a subcontract with Dan J. Sheehan Co. ("Sheehan" or
"subcontractor") to install tile on a construction project at the Oglethorpe
Mall in Savannah, Georgia. 3 The construction agreement provided
that "'[t]he prevailing party in any . . . arbitration shall be entitled to
recover, in addition to its damages, all costs and expenses incurred in
connection with the arbitration,"' including attorney and arbitrator
fees.214 After a dispute arose between the parties, Sheehan demanded
arbitration, claiming it was owed the outstanding balance of its
subcontract, as well as additional monies for removing and replacing tile
work. The subcontractor also sought attorney fees, interest, and costs.
McCrory filed a counterclaim for a set-off of damages allegedly incurred
215
during the tiling project.
At the conclusion of the arbitration, the parties briefed the arbitrator
on the proper legal standard for identifying the prevailing party, along
with several other issues. The subcontractor's claims for additional
monies and interest were denied, but the arbitrator ultimately awarded
$117,997 to Sheehan under its subcontract, less a $16,062 set-off award
to McCrory on its counterclaim. Even though the net award to Sheehan
was larger, the arbitrator identified McCrory as the prevailing party and
awarded it attorney fees and costs because Sheehan's final award was
less than one-fourth of what McCrory had offered the subcontractor to
settle the dispute. The trial court subsequently denied Sheehan's motion
to vacate the arbitrator's award on the basis that he manifestly
disregarded the law by naming McCrory as the prevailing party and
considering evidence of a settlement offer.216 The court of appeals
affirmed, reiterating that under Georgia law, a trial court may not

210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Id. at 510, 643 S.E.2d at 757.
284 Ga. App. 159, 643 S.E.2d 546 (2007).
Id. at 161, 643 S.E.2d at 548; O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13(b)(5) (2007).
Dan J. Sheehan Co., 284 Ga. App. at 160, 643 S.E.2d at 547.
Id.
Id., 643 S.E.2d at 547-48.
Id. at 160-61, 643 S.E.2d at 548.
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vacate an arbitrator's award on the ground of manifest disregard of the
law unless the claimant first proves that the allegedly disregarded law
was well-defined, explicit, and clearly applicable, and the arbitrator was
aware of the law but deliberately chose to ignore it. 217 Under both
federal and Georgia law, "'[A]n error in interpreting the applicable law
does not constitute manifest218 disregard. The applicable law must have
been deliberately ignored.'
The court concluded that because both parties recovered damages,
both effectively were prevailing parties, and the only relevant question
was whether the arbitrator's decision that the party who recovered the
least damages was the prevailing party resulted from a deliberate,
manifest disregard of the law. 219 Here, the court determined that the
arbitrator had used the correct prevailing party standard in reaching his
decision, namely that the arbitration award "'[did] not materially alter
the legal relationship between the parties beyond that which was
previously offered by McCrory. ' '22 ° Because the arbitrator used the
was not the
correct legal standard in rendering his decision, the 22award
1
result of a manifest disregard of the applicable law.
Finally, the court pointed out that judicial review of arbitration
awards is statutorily limited in Georgia.222 In addition, Sheehan's
failure to include a transcript of the arbitration proceedings meant that
by the record that the
Sheehan could not meet its burden to show
223
arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law.
V.

LEGISLATION

There was significantly less construction-related legislation enacted
during the survey period than in recent years. The Georgia General
Assembly, however, did make a number of changes and amendments to
existing statutes, the most -notable of which are discussed briefly below,

217. Id. at 161, 643 S.E.2d at 548 (citing Johnson Real Estate Invs., L.L.C. v. Aqua
Industrials, Inc., 282 Ga. App. 638, 639-40, 639 S.E.2d 589, 592-93 (2006)).
218. Id. (quoting Johnson Real Estate, 282 Ga. App. at 640, 639 S.E.2d at 593); see also
B.L. Harbert Int'l, L.L.C. v. Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905, 910 (11th Cir. 2006).
219. Dan J. Sheehan Co., 284 Ga. App. at 161, 643 S.E.2d at 548.
220. Id. at 162, 643 S.E.2d at 549.
221. Id.
222. Id.; see also Johnson Real Estate, 282 Ga. App. at 639-40, 639 S.E.2d at 593. The
court in Johnson Real Estate stated that "O.C.G.A. [section] 9-9-13(b) of the Georgia
Arbitration Code lists five grounds for vacating arbitration awards, including manifest
disregard of the law, and these statutory grounds provide the exclusive bases for vacating
an arbitration award under Georgia law." 282 Ga. App. at 639-40, 639 S.E.2d at 593
(citing O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13(b)).
223. Dan J. Sheehan Co., 284 Ga. App. at 163, 643 S.E.2d at 549.
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along with highlights of some of the key provisions of the recently
enacted residential and general contractor licensing scheme, which, as
amended, is scheduled to take effect next summer.
A.

ContractorLicensing

The date on which the new licensing requirements for residential and
general contractor licensing, sanctions, and related consequences will
become effective and enforceable was extended from January 1, 2008 to
July 1, 2008.224 As currently drafted, the statutory definitions of
contractor and contracting are extremely broad and include not only
performing construction work for an owner but also offering to perform
construction or construction management services for an owner by
submitting a bid or proposal.225
After July 1, 2008, as a matter of public policy, if an unlicensed
contractor enters into a contract for the performance of work for which
a residential or general contractor license is required and not otherwise
exempted, that contract is unenforceable.22 6 Under those circumstances, the unlicensed contractor is also precluded from recovering on any
lien or bond claim for labor, services, or materials provided under the
contract or any amendment to the contract. 227 The subsection, however, does not affect the obligations of a surety that has provided a bond
on behalf of an unlicensed contractor or provide any defense to a claim
on a bond or indemnity agreement that the principal or indemnitor is
unlicensed.22
Once the licensing deadline has passed, unlicensed persons who
engage in construction activities in Georgia without first obtaining a
license will also be subject to criminal penalties, fines, or both.229 In
addition, architects and engineers will also be subject to criminal
penalties, fines, or both for knowingly recommending that an owner
award a construction contract to an unlicensed contractor.23 °
Persons seeking licensure and exemption from examination under
O.C.G.A. section 43-41-8(a) 231 may submit an application, including all
required proof of the basis for exemption from examination, starting

224. Ga. S. Bill 115, § 9, Reg. Sess. (2007) (amending O.C.G.A. § 43-41-17 (2005 &
Supp. 2007)).
225. O.C.G.A. §§ 43-41-2(3) to (4) (2005 & Supp. 2007).
226. O.C.G.A. § 43-41-17(b).
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. O.C.G.A. § 43-41-12(a) (2005 & Supp. 2007).
230. Id. § 43-41-12(b).
231. O.C.G.A. § 43-41-8(a) (2005 & Supp. 2007).
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January 1, 2007.232 The exemption provisions, however, are poorly
drafted and do not give much, if any, guidance on what types of proof
must be submitted.2 33 For example, the statute requires that applicants seeking exemption from examination must prove that they have
"successfully engaged" in construction projects in Georgia by giving
"evidence of three successful projects located in Georgia which were
successfully completed over the period of five years immediately prior to
the time of application." 234 In addition to other deficiencies, the terms
"successful" and "successfully completed" are not defined in the statute.
Contractors holding a current and valid license from another state
that requires contractors to be licensed may apply for licensure by way
of reciprocity, provided that a similar privilege is afforded to Georgia
residents by their licensing state.238
As currently enacted, the licensing scheme establishes a joint system
of licensing whereby each business organization applying for licensure
must also have at least one licensed qualifying agent ("QA") "who is
actually engaged by ownership or employment in the practice of
residential or general contracting for such business organization or
entity and provides adequate supervision and is responsible for the
projects of such business organization or entity., 23 6 The QA must be
an individual, not a company, but the QA may serve in that capacity for
multiple contracting firms. 23 7 The QA by definition must "supervise,
direct, manage, and control all of the contracting activities" of the
business organization, 23' as well as supervise "all operations of the
business organization."2 39 The QA must be responsible for "all field
work at all sites," and is also responsible for financial matters for each
project and the business organization as a whole.24
The QA is
required to be "actually engaged" in the business organization's
contracting, 241 and must also hold final approval authority for all
construction work, all contracts, contract performance, the financial
affairs, and all other business matters of the business organization.24 2

232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

O.C.G.A. § 43-41-17(a).
See O.C.G.A. § 43-41-8(a)(2).
Id.
O.C.G.A. §§ 43-41-5, -8(3) (2005 & Supp. 2007).
O.C.G.A. § 43-41-9(a) (2005 & Supp. 2007).
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 43-41-2(7).
O.C.G.A. § 43-41-9(h).
Id.
Id. § 43-41-9(a).
Id. § 43-41-9(b), (h).
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When a firm has more than one QA, the statute mandates that all
QAs are
jointly and equally responsible for supervision of all operations of the
business organization, for all field work at all sites, and for financial
matters within the State of Georgia, both for the organization in
general and for each specific job for which his or her license was used
to obtain the building permit.243
This scheme raises a number of practical but unanswered questions,
such as how multiple QAs will be permitted to allocate supervisory
responsibilities, how final approval authority can be shared, and so on.
The spectre of unanticipated liability looms large. Although the
statute attempts to limit a QA's legal liability to the extent to which the
individual would ordinarily be subject, the litany of statutory responsibilities suggests that in actual practice there may be significantly
increased liability for persons serving as a QA.
Contractors should also be aware that the Board's decision to deny a
license or a request for reinstatement of a revoked license appears to be
conclusive; the statute currently provides for no formal hearing or appeal
244
to contracrights under the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act
tors whose application for licensure or license by reciprocity is deContractors may be entitled to appear before the Board
nied.24
informally to challenge a ruling, but the statute as currently enacted
does not provide any formal right or process to challenge an unfavorable
Board decision.2 46 Questions about procedure and other issues will
need to be worked out as the licensing requirements begin to take effect
and the Board fully assumes the powers and duties of its delegated
responsibilities.

B.

ContractorLicensing Board

The number of members appointed by the Governor to the State
Licensing Board for Residential and General Contractors was increased
from fourteen to fifteen, and the date by which residential and general
contractor members must be licensed was extended to January 1,
2008. 247

243. Id. § 43-41-9(h).
244. O.C.G.A. §§ 50-13-1 to -44 (2006 & Supp. 2007).
245. O.C.G.A. § 43-41-5(f).
246. Id.
247. Ga. H.R. Bill 224, § 1, Reg. Sess (2007) (amending O.C.G.A. § 43-41-3(a) to -3(c)

(2005)).
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Georgia's Right to RepairAct

Even though the July 1, 2008 deadline for contractor licensing has not
yet arrived, Georgia's mandatory dispute resolution framework for
residential construction defect claims, known colloquially as Georgia's
Right to Repair Act,24 was amended in 2006 to limit its application to
only those contractors who are required
to be licensed under the new
249
Georgia contractor licensing law.

D. Indemnification
Georgia's "anti-indemnity" statute, O.C.G.A. section 13-8-2,25 ° was
modified in part but remains a nonproportional fault provision that
voids, for public policy reasons, any construction contract provision that
requires one party to indemnify, hold harmless, insure, or defend the
other party for personal injury or property losses or damages arising
from the indemnitee's sole negligence. 2 1' The prior language that
permitted one party, by contract, to shift its loss to an insurance
company regardless of which party was at fault was deleted and replaced
by new language that allows one party, by contract, to require another
party to obtain project-specific insurance.2 52 The statute, as amended,
applies to all contracts entered into, extended, or renewed on or after
July 1, 2007.253

248. O.C.G.A. §§ 8-2-35 to -43 (2004 & Supp. 2007).
249. Id.; Ga. S. Bill 115, § 9, Reg. Sess. (2007) (amending O.C.G.A. § 43-41-17).
250. O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2 (1981 & Supp 2007).
251. Ga. H.R. Bill 136, § 1, Reg. Sess. (2007) (amending O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(b)).
252. Id.
253. Id.

